Supreme Court, U. S.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

NO. 77-228

DR. ANNIE LAURIE KEYES,
Petitioner

versus

LENOIR-RHYNE COLLEGE, a nonprofit corporation;
WALLACE J. JORGENSON, Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of Lenoir-Rhyne College, and
DR. RAYMOND M. BOST, President of
Lenoir-Rhyne College
Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

COMES NOW Petitioner, Annie Laurie Keyes, by and through her undersigned attorneys, and respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the Judgment and Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rendered in this action on March 31, 1977.

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals, which is reported at 552 F.2d 579 , is attached hereto as Appendix "C". The District Court's Memorandum of Decision, which is not reported, is attached hereto as Appendix "A". The District

Court's Judgment, which is not reported, is attached hereto as Appendix "B".

JURISDICTION

The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on March 31, 1977. Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Rehearing In Banc which was denied by the Court of Appeals on May 12, 1977. A copy of the Order denying rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix "D". This Court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the District Court, consistent with the congressional objectives of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, may impose an undefined standard of proof in proceedings under these acts which involve educational institutions.

2. Whether the trial court in a Title VII and Equal Pay action may allow the defendant to justify any male-female wage disparity on the basis of evaluations and merit ratings when the court has denied the plaintiff all access to the evaluations and merit ratings.

3. Whether a Court of Appeals may apply the "clearly erroneous" standard to the finding of ultimate fact in this case—that the defendants had not discriminated against the plaintiff and the class.

STATUTES INVOLVED

This case involves Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e *et seq.* and in particular, §703(a) of the Act which, in pertinent part, provides as follows:

"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (or) (2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to a) deprive any individual of employment opportunities or b) otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

The case also involves the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206 *et seq.* and in particular Section 206(d)(1) of the Act, which, in pertinent part, provides as follows:

"No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Annie Laurie Keyes, was employed by the respondent Lenoir-Rhyne College as a Professor of

Education for the school year 1968-1969. Her contract of employment was renewed through the 1972-1973 school year. The college refused to renew Ms. Keyes' contract for the 1973-1974 school year.

The complaint in this action was filed in the District Court on March 27, 1974, against Lenoir-Rhyne College, Wallace J. Jorgenson, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the college, and Dr. Raymond M. Bost, President of the college. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' employment practices discriminated against women because of their sex in violation of Title VII and the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and invoked the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Title VII, and 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1343, 2201 and 2202. Invoking the pendent jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff also alleged that the defendants had agreed that she would be able to continue her employment until she became 68 years of age and had breached this agreement by denying her re-employment for 1973-1974.

The plaintiff alleged a class action and prayed for a declaratory judgment and class and individual injunctive relief including plaintiff's reinstatement and back pay.

The defendants timely answered generally denying plaintiff's allegations and challenging the propriety of a class action. The defendants moved that the action be dismissed with respect to defendants Jorgenson and Bost. On October 3, 1974, the District Court denied the motions to dismiss and conditionally certified a class consisting of "[t]hose females previously and presently employed and those who may hereafter be employed as faculty members at Lenoir-Rhyne College." The District Court further ordered on June 2, 1975, that the action be tried by a jury on the pendent state contract claim and by an advisory jury on the Title

VII claim. Prior to trial, the plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to allege that the defendants' practices violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963, §206 *et seq.*, and to pray for an award of attorney fees. These motions were allowed.

The case was tried on October 21-25 and 28, 1975. At the close of the arguments, the court dismissed the individual defendants and submitted to the jury the contract issue. The court further asked the jury to advise whether the defendants had unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff or the class and whether the defendants had denied equal pay to the plaintiff or to the class. The jury answered the pendent contract issue against the plaintiff. It issued an advisory opinion that the plaintiff individually had not been discriminated against or denied equal pay but that the class had been discriminated against and denied equal pay.

The plaintiff moved to set aside the jury verdict on the contract issue on November 19, 1975, and submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the discrimination issues. The defendants thereafter submitted counter proposals.

The court issued its Memorandum of Decisions and Judgment on January 2, 1976. The court held that plaintiff had failed to establish proof of overt discriminatory practices by the defendants and that the statistical proof, standing alone, was insufficient to prove a *prima facie* case of discrimination because of the particular skills required of college faculty members and, in any event, the defendants had met their burden in explaining the disparities; that the advisory jury failed to give proper consideration and weight to the explanatory evidence offered by the defendants; and that the defendants should prevail on the discrimination and equal pay issues. On the breach of contract issue the court denied

the motion to set aside the verdict. Accordingly, the court issued a judgment for the defendants on all issues and dismissed the complaint.

The Court of Appeals on March 31, 1977, affirmed the decision below on the grounds that the findings of the District Court were not clearly erroneous and that the District Court had not erred by refusing to allow the plaintiff to inspect any documents dealing with faculty evaluations or merit ratings.

Judge Craven, dissenting, concluded that the plaintiff had established a *prima facie* case which the defendants had failed to rebut.

Ms. Keyes filed a petition for Rehearing In Banc on April 13, 1977. This petition was denied on May 12, 1977.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Decisions Below Substantially Impair The Effectiveness Of Title VII And The Equal Pay Act In Eliminating Employment And Wage Discrimination With Respect To College Instructors. The Court Should Review These Decisions Too Insure That The Appropriate Standards Of Proof Are Applied In Such Cases.

A. Absent an admission by an employer of wage discrimination, statistical data is the most reliable if not the only means of showing such discrimination, and plaintiff relied on such evidence. Judge Craven notes some of the most telling and unexplained statistical disparities in his dissenting opinion:

> The record does, however, contain a comparison of salaries within the departments—Plaintiff's Exhibit 13a, "Confidential Salary Information." Within the Education Department of which Mrs. Keyes was a member, it appears that Mrs. Keyes, who was a full professor, received in 1968-69 a salary of $9,450, whereas male professor Schwarzbek received a salary of $10,206 although he was an associate professor and nontenured and she was a full professor and tenured. The documentary evidence for the Education Department also shows that Mr. Wiener was paid $12,015 when Mrs. Keyes received $11,667, although Mr. Wiener was a nontenured assistant professor and Mrs. Keyes was a tenured full professor.
>
> In the Mathematics Department it appears that Mrs. Hawn received a salary of $9,129 and Mr. Smith a salary of $10,438, although they were of the same rank and Mr. Smith was nontenured and Mrs. Hawn was tenured.
>
> In the English Department Mrs. Swink was paid $6,606 and Mr. Mahan was paid $8,865, although both were of the same rank and nontenured. Also in the English Department Mr. Whitesides was paid $7,695 and Mrs. Jeffers, $5,895, although she was tenured and he was not and they were of the same rank. 552 F.2d at 582.

As Judge Craven further notes, Dr. Bost, the College's president, was the only witness who attempted to justify these disparities, and he testified that he could not say precisely what accounted for the salary disparity. *Id.*

Under the standards set out by this Court, the plaintiff's statistical evidence established a *prima facie* case of discrimination as to the individual plaintiff and the class. *E.g. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States*, 45 U.S.L.W. 4506, 4509-10 (U.S. May 31, 1977); *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). However, the District Court concluded that "there are so many legitimate

factors which may be considered in determining the salary of a college professor that it would be most difficult, if not impossible, to apply the same rule or standard applicable to an industrial assembly line." This Court's decision on the Title VII burden of proof do not support the creation of a higher and undefined standard of proof for a college faculty member seeking to show discrimination. *Cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, supra; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra.* Neither does this case justify a rejection of the similar burden of proof standards under the Equal Pay Act. *Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,* 417 U.S. 188 (1974). Even if the Court sanctions a higher standard of proof, it should clearly delineate the standard in order to avoid varying decisions by the lower federal courts.

As this court pointed out in its *McDonnell Douglas* decision, the requirement that an employer come forward and explain his action, once apparent disparate treatment is established, simply places the burden on the party who is in the best position to explain the challenged practice. If it is a legitimate explanation the employer should be required to disclose it whether the case involves the assembly line or white collar positions such as college professors.

It is not unusual for federal courts to be called upon to determine unlawful discrimination by colleges and universities. Long ago, even with alleged special requirements for admission, the courts prohibited racial discrimination by colleges and universities in the admission of students. *Sweatt v. Painter,* 339 U.S. 629, *reh. den.,* 339 U.S. 629 (1950); *Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,* 332 U.S. 631 (1948); *Gantt v. Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina,* 320 F. 2d 611 (4th Cir.) *cert. den.,* 375 U.S. 814 (1963). The courts have also been able to determine

illegal practices in cases as or more complex than the employment and promotion of college faculty members and the setting of salaries. *See, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,* 422 U.S. 405 (1975); *Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,* 410 U.S. 366, *reh. den.,* 411 U.S. 910 (1973), on remand 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn. 1973); *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,* 401 U.S. 424 (1971); *N.C.T.A. v. Asheboro City Board of Education,* 393 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1968); *Chambers v. Hendersonville City Board of Education,* 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966). If defendants have an explanation for the patent discrimination in male-female salaries and promotions, they, rather than the plaintiff, should be required to produce it by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. *Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra; Chambers v. Hendersonville City Board of Education, supra; EEOC v. Tufts Institution of Learning,* 10 EPD ¶10,572 (D. Mass. Sept. 8, 1975); *Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh,* 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D.Pa. 1973). Any lesser standard would abandon the responsibility of federal courts under Title VII and would ignore the clear purpose and objective of the Act. *Cf., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,* 424 U.S. 747 (1976); *Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,* 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

B. The District Court alternatively ruled that even if the plaintiff had established a *prima facie* case, the defendants had shown by strong, clear and convincing evidence that they had not discriminated against the individual plaintiff or the class.

There are two compelling reasons why this court should review this ruling. The first is that the District Court, after denying the plaintiff an opportunity to inspect merit or faculty evaluations, allowed the defendants to justify the pay differentials in part on the results of these evaluations. (The

majority opinion in the Court of Appeals indicates that the college did not rely on the evaluations. This conclusion simply disregards the defendants' testimony at trial and the District Court's Finding of Fact #18. See Appendix E and Appendix A at 12-a). Additionally, while the defendants testified about the use of the evaluations, they did not place the evaluations into evidence. Thus, the plaintiff had no means of effectively cross-examining the witnesses to show that this proferred explanation of the salary differential was in fact a pretext. If such an untested explanation of disparity of treatment satisfies the defendant's burden to explain a wage disparity, the clear, cogent and convincing evidence standard set out in *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra*, is meaningless.

Additionally, while the defendants did advance a number of other factors to explain the salary disparities, they could not explain how these factors were used. Thus, when women had more degrees or training, defendants talked about experience; when women had more training and experience, defendants advanced reputation; and when women were better qualified in all possible respects defendants offered no explanation or noted that salaries had been adjusted—after the filing of this proceeding. Although factors used in evaluating professors' pay may not be susceptible to quantitative measurement, they must at least "be weighed qualitatively in accordance with established guidelines." *Green v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech University*, 335 F. Supp. 249, 251 (1971) *aff'd* 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973). The defendants produced no evidence of such guidelines.

If plaintiffs who seek to remedy discrimination in education must face the additional hurdles of an undefined higher burden of proof coupled with no opportunity to effectively

test the proferred explanations of the defendants for disparity of treatment then Congress' intent to eradicate discrimination in the especially critical field of education will not be fulfilled. This court should instruct the lower federal courts that such departures from the established allocation of proof in a discrimination action is unwarranted and should give the lower courts direction in how to make this allocation when the case involves college instructors or similarly skilled employees.

II. The Standard Of Review Applied By The Court Of Appeals To The Determination That There Was No Discrimination Conflicts With The Standard Of Review The Fifth Circuit Has Established For Title VII Cases.

The majority opinion below affirmed the District Court's determination that the plaintiff had failed to establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination upon a determination that the findings were not clearly erroneous.

The "clearly erroneous" standard of review applied to the ultimate fact in the case, the establishment of discrimination, is inconsistent with the standard of review in *Causey v. Ford Motor Co.*, 516 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1975) (Bell, J.). This standard is set out in *Causey* as follows:

> "There exists, however, a significant distinction for the purpose of applying the clearly erroneous test between findings of subsidiary fact and findings of ultimate fact. (Citation omitted) Finding a subsidiary fact involves the determination of an evidentiary or primary fact; finding an ultimate fact, on the other hand, 'may involve the very basis on which judgment of fallible evidence is to be made.'

****

> Although discrimination vel non is essentially a question of fact it is, at the same time, the ultimate issue for resolution in this case, being expressly proscribed by 42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000e-2(a). As such a finding of discrimination or non-discrimination is a finding of ultimate fact. (Citations omitted) In reviewing the district court's findings, therefore, we will proceed to make an independent determination of appellant's allegations of discrimination, though bound by findings of subsidiary fact which are themselves not clearly erroneous." 516 F.2d at 419.

The Fifth Circuit has adherred to this standard in a consistent line of cases. See *Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp.*, 538 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976); *Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service*, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976); *East v. Romine, Inc.*, 518 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1975). As the dissenting opinion by Judge Craven in the Court of Appeals indicates, the ultimate finding of the District Court would not withstand an independent determination of the allegations of the plaintiff. The significance which Congress attached to the implementation of Title VII has long been recognized by this Court. The implementation of Title VII requires a more careful scrutiny of finding of the ultimate fact than can be attained by application of the "clearly erroneous" standard; therefore, the standard of the Fifth Circuit should be adopted.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Petition of Annie Laurie Keyes, for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, be granted.

Respectfully Submitted

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that three (3) copies of the foregoing Petition For A Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, have been served this 10th day of August, 1977 by the United States first class mail, upon the following:

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APPENDIX "A"

IN THE

District Court of the United States

FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

DR. ANNIE LAURIE KEYES,
Plaintiff.

vs.

LENOIR RHYNE COLLEGE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

Civil Action
No. ST-C-74-10

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The Plaintiff, Dr. Annie Laurie Keyes, instituted this action against the Defendants, Lenoir Rhyne College, its President, Dr. Raymond M. Bost, and the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, Wallace J. Jorgenson, seeking injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief for herself and other female faculty members of the College for alleged discrimination in employment opportunities because of their sex and age. The action was brought under the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e, et seq., the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and 28 U.S.C.A. 2201 and 2202.

In Count Two of the Complaint the Plaintiff, alleging pendant jurisdiction, seeks damages for breach of contract under the common law of North Carolina. She contends that she and the Defendants entered into a contract at the time of her initial employment under which she was promised continuous employment until age 68 if her work was satisfactory,

and that the Defendants breached the contract by requiring her to retire at age 65.

The Defendants answered denying any discrimination against female faculty members or any breach of the Plaintiff's employment contract. They demanded a jury trial on all issues of fact in both alleged causes of action, and the Plaintiff moved to strike such demand. The Court denied the Plaintiff's Motion as to the contract action contained in Count Two of the Complaint, and ordered the causes tried together with the jury acting in an advisory capacity as to the discrimination issue.

The Court certified the action as a class action consisting of all past, present and future female faculty members who have been, who are presently, and who in the future may be adversely affected by any discriminatory employment practices based on sex by the Defendants.

Just prior to trial the Plaintiff moved to amend her Complaint to set forth a claim of denial of equal pay because of her sex under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.A. 206(d), and for counsel fees. The Court, in its discretion, allowed the Motions.

The matter was tried by the Court and a jury at the October 1975 Term in Statesville and the Court submitted to the jury issues of employment discrimination based on sex as to the Plaintiff and her class, denial of equal pay based on sex, and breach of contract. The jury answered the issues of breach of contract, denial of equal pay and employment discrimination as to the Plaintiff against her, but found that the Defendant College discriminated against female faculty members because of sex in salaries and benefits and had denied them equal pay.

The Plaintiff moved to set aside the jury verdict on the contract issues and to grant her a new trial on the grounds that the Court erred in failing to admit parol evidence relative to the contract of employment, and the Defendants urge the Court to disregard the jury findings on the class discrimination issues.

The Court has reviewed the evidence, briefs, arguments of counsel and the jury verdict, and now enters its findings and conclusions.

1. The Plaintiff, Dr. Annie Laurie Keyes, is a female citizen of the United States and resides in Catawba County, North Carolina. She was employed by the Defendant Lenoir Rhyne College for the 1968-69 school year as a Professor of Education. Her contract of employment was renewed each year until the end of the 1972-73 school year when she was required to retire at the age of 65. After her forced retirement she obtained employment with the public school system of Catawba County at an equal or greater rate of pay and was still so employed at the time of trial.

2. The Defendant Lenoir Rhyne College is a private institution, chartered by the State of North Carolina as a non-profit corporation to provide post secondary, liberal arts and professional education, and is located in Hickory, North Carolina. It is a co-educational liberal arts college owned and operated by the North Carolina Synod of the Lutheran Church in America to provide education to young people embodying Christian principles. It was founded in 1891 by a group of Lutherans with its primary purpose to train the clergy and school teachers. It operates with a relatively small administrative staff and faculty, the total faculty numbering about 90 people, and an average student enrollment of 1300. The College is governed by a Board of Trustees selected by

the Lutheran Church and such Board determines the policy of the College as to employment, retirement, compensation, and duties of faculty members.

3. The Defendants, Dr. Raymond Bost and Wallace J. Jorgenson, are the President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees, respectively, and under the by-laws and constitution of the College are authorized and empowered to recommend appointment and approval of faculty and staff employees and to administer employment policies and practices set by the Board.

The President is the Chief Administrative Officer of the College and is charged with the duty to make final executive decisions on matters of administration and to appoint key administrative personnel, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees. He is charged with the responsibility of making faculty appointments, recommended by the Academic Dean and the Chairman of the Division and Department involved, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees. The President recommends to the Board the compensation and promotions of faculty members and the appointment of Department and Division Chairmen.

4. The Academic Dean of the College is entrusted with the oversight of the instructional program and with the promotion of academic excellence, and in this responsibility he is to conduct faculty procurement and to recommend to the President appointments, retention, promotion and dismissal of instructional personnel to maintain a competent teaching staff, utilizing the counsel of Divisional and Departmental Chairmen. For the extra duties Division Chairmen are paid an additional salary of $100 per month or $900 per school term.

5. The College has four academic divisions which are headed by Chairmen or Chairpersons who annually submit reports to the Academic Dean and also assess, in consultation with the Department Chairmen, the needs of the Division regarding instructional staff and to cooperate with the Dean in selecting instructors for the academic program. These Chairmen evaluate annually the work of all staff members serving in the Divisions and forward the information to the Academic Dean including recommendations for faculty advancement, retention, or termination. The Divisions are divided into 14 Departments of Instruction, each headed by a Chairman. It is the duty of the Chairman to oversee instruction in the Department and to evaluate annually the work of all staff members serving within such Department, and to make, to the Chairman of the Division, recommendations for the advancement, retention or release of the staff. Because of the extra duties, Department Chairmen are paid an additional salary of $50 per month or $450 per school term.

6. The College has four ranks of faculty members as follows: Professor, Associate Professor, Assistant Professor and Instructor. Salary ranges for each of these four ranks are adopted annually by the Board of Trustees without regard to sex. In 1969-70, the College adopted a promotion policy requiring a doctorate for full professorship. Prior to that time, a Ph.D., or its equivalent was not mandatory for promotion to the rank of full professor and those people who had been promoted prior to the adoption of the 1969-70 policy were not affected and retained their rank. The College grants tenure of position as recognition of competent and continuous service as a member of the teaching staff. Tenure is obtained by a full professor on appointment to a fourth year of service on the faculty after having completed three academic years of full service at any rank. Associate and Assistant Professors

obtain tenure upon renewal of appointment after having completed six years of full time service on the faculty at any rank. Tenure does not extend to the rank of Instructor. Termination of limited, continuous or tenured appointment is warranted for the following reasons: incompetence, gross neglect of duty, immorality, demonstrable financial exigencies upon the part of the College or the elimination or reduction of a Department. In addition, tenure may be granted to a faculty member with initial employment.

7. The Board of Trustees determines the policy of the College relative to retirement of all personnel, including faculty members. In March of 1969 the Board reduced the retirement age from 68 to 65 and gave written notice of such change to all faculty members and employees. The 1969-70 Faculty Handbook, and for each school year since, contained the following statement as to retirement:

> "All College employees will retire at the end of the academic year in which they attain the age of 65. The academic year ends with the annual summer school graduation exercises. As in the past, extensions of service beyond the stated retirement age may be made for definite periods not to exceed one (1) year each as approved by a special vote of the Board of Trustees."

8. Both before and after the change in the retirement age the College considered the following factors in determining whether to grant annual appointments to faculty members beyond retirement age: (1) the desire of the faculty member to continue teaching; (2) the continued effectiveness of the teacher; (3) the availability of replacement; and (4) the needs of the College for the continued service of the faculty member in question.

9. By letter dated October 31, 1967 the College, through its then President, Dr. Voight Cromer, offered the Plaintiff a one (1) year faculty appointment for the academic year of 1968-69. The letter stated, in part, as follows:

> "Upon the authorization of the Board of Trustees, given at its recent meeting on October 27, it pleases me to extend to you an official appointment to a position on the faculty of Lenoir Rhyne College as Professor in the Department of Education, effective September 1, 1968. While the initial appointment is for one (1) academic year, it is made with the expectation of renewal on the assumption that the relationship will be mutually satisfactory."

The Plaintiff accepted the appointment and entered upon her duties September 1, 1968. On March 17, 1969 she was extended an appointment for the 1969-70 academic year which she accepted. Then on March 20, 1970 she was offered and accepted an appointment, with tenure, for the 1970-71 academic year as Professor of Education. The same procedure was followed in 1971 for the 1971-72 school year but in 1972 she was advised that the appointment for the academic year 1972-73 would be the last one since she had reached the retirement age of 65.

10. The Plaintiff requested that she be allowed to teach beyond her retirement age but the request was denied by the administration of the College. She appealed the decision to the Board of Trustees and a full hearing was held on July 18, 1973 before the Committee on Instruction of the Board. The Committee and the Board denied her request and she was forced to retire.

11. The Plaintiff thereafter filed charges with the United States Department of Labor alleging that female faculty

members at the College were being denied equal pay. An investigation was made but the evidence does not disclose the findings, but no action was taken by the Labor Department. The Plaintiff then filed charges of sex discrimination against the College with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On January 11, 1974, the Plaintiff was notified that the Commission had not filed a civil action with respect to her charge and had not entered into a conciliation agreement with the College and that she had a right to institute an action herself within 90 days of the receipt of the notice. The Plaintiff thereupon brought this action.

12. The Plaintiff offered no credible evidence that her sex played any part in the Board's decision not to extend her appointment for another year after she reached age 65. The evidence clearly established that both men and women had been permitted to teach beyond retirement, and that both men and women had been denied such permission. For example, since 1966 three female teachers were extended and allowed to teach beyond retirement while only one was denied such privilege — that one was the Plaintiff, Dr. Keyes. During the same time eight male teachers were granted such permission and three were denied. The evidence shows that the Plaintiff was not recommended for the extension of her appointment by her departmental and divisional chairmen, and that serious questions existed concerning her continued effectiveness as a teacher. There was evidence of a serious health problem during her last year of teaching, and evidence that she experienced difficulty in performing committee assignments. Her method of student teaching was critized by her Department head and numerous complaints as to her teaching came from her students. The Court finds that the Board's decision not to renew the Plaintiff's appointment beyond retirement age was based upon the foregoing factors and considerations and not upon her sex.

13. The Plaintiff testified in her own behalf and called several other female faculty members of the College as witnesses at the trial. None of these witnesses related any specific instances of overt discrimination by the College. Thus she relies entirely upon statistical data to prove her case and now contends that she has established a prima facie case of discrimination against the Defendants. During extensive discovery the College furnished the Plaintiff detailed records as to faculty members from 1966-67 through 1973-74. The Plaintiff offered a female law student as an expert witness who had compiled from these records various charts which, in her opinion, showed that women faculty members at Lenor Rhyne College, notwithstanding their degrees and experience, have received less pay than comparably situated men. She also testified that these charts show that in comparing individual male and female faculty members, male members were promoted more readily. These charts were admitted into evidence and have been examined closely by the Court.

14. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's showing is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as to sex but, nevertheless, proceeded to offer evidence tending to show that no pattern, practice or policy of sex discrimination existed at the College. Officials of the College and Members of the Board of Trustees testified that no policy of sex discrimination exists and to their knowledge none had ever existed. This testimony was supported by several female faculty members who stated that they knew of no instance of discrimination and that they felt they were not discriminated against because of their sex. The College then offered evidence which shows that each discrepancy between the pay and promotion of male and female faculty members was based upon legal and logical reasons and not upon sex. The following findings are gleaned from the evidence offered by the College.

15. The following chart was offered by the Defendants to show the ratio of male and female faculty members employed by Lenoir Rhyne College from 1966-67 through 1973-74:

CHART

Academic Year	No. Employed	Percentage of Total Employed
1966-67	52 Male	67%
	25 Female	33%
1967-68	52 Male	66%
	27 Female	34%
1968-69	61 Male	70%
	27 Female	30%
1969-70	63 Male	66%
	32 Female	34%
1970-71	62 Male	67%
	30 Female	33%
1971-72	66 Male	70%
	27 Female	30%
1972-73	62 Male	67%
	30 Female	33%
1973-74	67 Male	72%
	26 Female	28%

16. The following chart offered by the Defendants and taken from EEOC Decisions, No. 74-93, March 7, 1973, Section 6426, Page 4137, shows the ratio of females and males on the teaching faculty of Colleges and Universities in the United States in the years 1968-69 and 1972-73:

PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES TEACHING, NATIONALLY

Year	Universities	Colleges & Universities
1968-69	14.8%	19.1%
1972-73	16.5%	20.0%

The information contained in these charts shows that Lenoir Rhyne College has a higher percentage of female faculty members than the national average.

17. The responsibility for the recruitment of faculty members for Lenoir Rhyne College rests with the Academic Dean. The evidence shows that the Dean lists the vacancies with the Cooperative College Registry, a national service out of Washington, D. C., which serves both men and women applicants. Vacancies are also listed with the various graduate schools for both men and women. In addition, unsolicited applications are received from both men and women interested in teaching at the College. The Dean and the Department Head screen the applications and reduce them to two (2) candidates who are invited to the campus for interviews. The interviews are with the Dean, the Division and Department Chairmen and the President of the College. The President and the Dean, through negotiations with the interested applicant, determine the initial salary, within the range set by the Board of Trustees. The factors used to determine the initial salary are as follows: (1) highest degree; (2) nature of prior experience; (3) length of experience; (4) area of specialization; (5) institution attended, and (6) the condition of the market, such as the number of qualified persons available in the field. For example, about five (5) years ago a person with a Ph.D. degree in Physics could command a high salary level, but, with the current state of the economy

and with the present supply of persons with such degree, institutions can obtain such services at a lower salary level.

18. After the initial salary is determined, the annual increases in salary are based upon availability of financial resources and the teacher evaluation criteria. In the 1970-71 school year, a written annual teacher evaluation procedure was established. This procedure requires the Division and Department Chairmen to evaluate each faculty member according to his or her teaching effectiveness, continuing scholarly development, service to the College, church and community, and the ability to work with the faculty, administration and staff. The College also uses these factors and evaluations in determining renewal of contracts, tenure, renewal or non-renewal of contracts of teachers after reaching retirement age, and also to stimulate and encourage faculty members to strive for higher levels of scholarship and teaching efficiency.

19. In 1969, the College adopted and has since followed, a requirement that a teacher must hold a doctorate degree before attaining the rank of full Professor or Associate Professor. Before the adoption of this policy several members of the faculty had been elevated to the position of Professor or Associate Professor who did not hold doctorate degrees. Upon adoption of the policy the rank of these teachers was not reduced and they have remained in such rank. The attainment of these higher ranks by the several individuals resulted from their long, continuous and superior service to the College. Three (3) individuals with master degrees were full Professors in 1972-73 and they continued in that rank. These three persons had held the rank of full Professor for long periods of time, one for 13 years, one for 25 years and the other one for 37 years. All had at least 25 years of teaching experience and had been with the College for more than 25

years. One was with the Business Department, another in the Math Department (both areas in which doctorate degrees were scarce at the time). The third had been with the Music Department for more than 36 years.

There were seven individuals with master degrees who held the rank of Associate Professor in the year 1972-73. Six of these were males and one was a female. The female was in the Music Department and had been with the College for 26 years and had held the rank for 9 years. One male was an Associate Professor of Economics and Chairman of the Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences with a master's degree from Bucknell University and additional graduate study at the University of Chicago. He had been with the College for 25 years and had been Associate Professor for 14 years. Another male had 20 years teaching experience, 16 years with Lenoir Rhyne College, and had been an Associate Professor for 10 years in the Business Department and held two graduate degrees. Another male had 22 years teaching experience, 18 with this College, had been an Associate Professor for 10 years, and was Director of Athletics and head football coach. Another male had 33 years teaching experience, 12 with this College, and had been Associate Professor of Biology for 8 years. He had a master's degree from Wittenburg University and did additional graduate study at Ohio State and the University of Tennessee. Another male was an Associate Professor of English with a master's degree from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, with additional graduate study at the University of Southern California. He had 25 years teaching experience with Lenoir Rhyne College and had been an Associate Professor for 9 years. The last male had a master's degree from the University of Leipzig and had completed additional graduate studies at the University of Jena.

20/ In 1972-73, six males with doctorate degrees held the rank of Assistant Professor and three females with such degrees held the same rank. There were 20 males with master's degrees teaching as Assistant Professors and 13 females with such degrees and rank.

21. The following chart offered by the Defendants indicates the ratio of master and doctorate degrees awarded to men and women in all fields in the United States for the years shown. (From EEOC Decisions, No. 74-93, March 7, 1973, Section 6426, Page 4137).

DEGREES AWARDED, ALL FIELDS, UNITED STATES

Degree	Years	Total	Male	Female	Percentage Female
M.A.	1970-71	230,509	138,146	92,363	40.6
Ph.D.	1970-71	32,107	27,530	4,577	14.7
Ph.D.	1960-69	154,111	136,182	17,929	11.6

The following chart shows the women in the work force, including teachers in colleges and Universities:

WOMEN IN THE WORK FORCE

Source: Occupational Outlook Handbook, 1974-75 Edition, U.S. Department of Labor 1974

1. *College and University Teachers* (Page 208)

"In 1972, about 620,000 teachers worked in more than 2,600 colleges and universities."

"In 1972, about one-fourth (1/4) of all college and university teachers were women."

2. *Scientific and Technical Occupations*

Occupations	*% Women*
Biologist	33% (Page 367)
Mathematician	15% (Page 372)
Chemist	10% (Page 380)
Physicist	4% (Page 384)

3. *Health Occupations*

Registered Nurses	99% (Page 502)

4. *Social Scientists*

Economists	6% (Page 532)
Geographers	15% (Page 536)
Historians	10% (Page 534)
Political Scientists	10% (Page 538)
Sociologists	14% (Page 540)
Psychologists	25% (Page 564)

22. The four academic divisions were formed in 1969-70 and since that time two female professors have chaired two of such divisions. Dr. Laura Clayton, a female Professor with a Ph.D. degree, served as Divisional Chairman of the Humanities Division in 1972-73 and Dr. Carolyn Huff, a female Professor with a Ph.D. degree, served as Chairman of the Social and Behaviorial Sciences Division in 1974-75. In the academic year 1972-73, the Nursing Department, the History Department and the English Department were chaired by women professors. Dr. Farthing, a female with a doctorate degree in Nursing, has headed the Nursing Department for

many years. Women teachers have served as Chairman of numerous committees during the years covered by the evidence.

23. The following chart depicts the relative rank of the highest salaried female faculty members of the College from 1967-68 through 1973-74:

Academic Year	Rank of Highest Female
1967-68	2nd and 4th
1968-69	2nd
1969-70	1st
1970-71	7th
1971-72	7th
1972-73	14th
1973-74	4th

The highest paid faculty member during the year 1969-70 was a female and she was the second highest paid faculty member during the academic year 1968-69. She was a graduate of the College, New York Theological Seminary, and held a Ph.D. degree from New York University. She had 22 years experience in teaching and her field (Sociology) was one in which few doctorate degrees were available at the time. Her salary and rank were determined by her degrees, her experience, her area of specialty and the market demand. Her sex played no part in her pay or rank.

24. In answer to the discrepancies in pay of female faculty members shown by the charts prepared and explained by the Plaintiff's expert witness, the Defendants offered the Academic Dean of the College as a witness. His testimony was

long and involved and dealt with each faculty member's pay shown in the charts. He outlined the degrees of each teacher, institution attended, teaching experience or the lack of it, the availability of the skill in the market place at the time of employment, area of specialization, and the need for such skill in the College program. In each instance of apparent salary disparity between male and female faculty member similarly situated, a careful examination of the evidence offered by the College reveals a valid, consistent, non-discriminatory reason for the salary levels. The following examples for the year 1972-73 will serve to make the point:

— The highest paid Professor at the College during this year was a male with a Ph.D degree in Chemistry from Ohio State University. He attended Tokyo Institute of Technology and has a post-doctoral at the University of Kansas and additional graduate study at the University of Tokyo, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the University of Tennessee. He had 17 years experience of teaching, 15 of them at Lenoir Rhyne and has held the rank of full Professor for 10 years. He chairs the Department of Chemistry. His salary was dictated by the area of his specialization (Chemistry), years of experience, institutions attended and degrees obtained and areas of responsibility in his field. There are no comparable females in the Chemistry Department and nationally the percentage of women in the workforce (teachers and non-teachers) in Chemistry is only 10 per cent. The evidence is clear that this salary and rank are unrelated to sex.

The second highest salary for a faculty member of the College for 1972-73 was also a male with a Ph.D. degree in Physics, with ten years of experience, 8 of which were at Lenoir Rhyne. He attended the College and the University of North Carolina where he obtained his doctorate degree.

His salary was determined by his area of specialization (Physics), years of experience and the institutions attended and degrees obtained, and the competition in the market place for his skill at the time of his initial hiring. There are no females in the Department and none are available. During 1974 only 4% of the nation's Physicists (teachers and non-teachers) were women. He is head of his Department and his salary and rank were based on factors not related to sex.

The third highest paid faculty member in 1972-73 was a male with a Ph.D. in Mathematics with ten years teaching experience. He attended Lenoir Rhyne College, California Institute of Technology, and holds a Ph.D. degree from Duke University. He taught at Duke and at Georgia Tech and was hired from Georgia Tech by Radio Corporation of America as a computer expert for the United States Space Exploration effort. At the time he was hired there were no professors in the Math Department who possessed doctorate degrees and it was necessary for the College to pay a higher salary in order to obtain him. The highest ranking member of the Department at that time was a male with 27 years experience and head of the Department. This new comer received a starting salary higher than the Chairman of the Department. There was no comparable female faculty member in the Math Department and nationally only 15% of Mathematicians (teachers and non-teachers) were female and only 15% of the Ph.D. degrees awarded in 1970-71 in the nation were women. His salary was determined by the area of specialization, the market demand for his skills and the needs of the College for a Ph.D. for the Math Department. There was no sex discrimination in his selection or in the fixing of his salary.

25. The Defendants offered evidence comparing the salary of a female professor with that of several male professors

similarly situated to show that many factors must be considered in setting salaries for college professors. Dr. Laura Clayton, a female profesor with a Ph.D. degree from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and who had additional graduate study at the American Academy in Rome, the University of Copenhagen in Denmark, the Virgilian School in Naples and Humay University of the West Indies, and with 14 years teaching experience, 9 years with the College, earned a higher salary with the College than a similarly situated male in the Religion Department with a Ph.D. degree from Duke University and with 21 years teaching experience. She earned a higher salary than the following *male* faculty members: (a) A Professor in the History Department who had a Ph.D. degree from the University of South Carolina, with 13 years of teaching experience; (b) A Professor in the Music Department with a master's degree in Music from American Conservatory of Music and with 37 years of teaching experience at Lenoir Rhyne, and 37 years as a full professor; (c) A Professor in the Math Department with 26 years teaching experience at Lenoir Rhyne and 13 years as a full professor with a master's degree from Western Reserve University, additional graduate study at the University of Maryland and all but a dissertation on a doctorate at Western Reserve University; (d) An Associate Professor of Biology with a master's degree from Purdue University, and a Ph.D. degree from the University of Michigan and 9 years teaching experience; (e) An Associate Professor in Sociology with a Ph.D. degree from the University of Nebraska with 24 years teaching experience; (f) An Associate Professor of Music with a M.M.E. degree from Northwestern University and an E.D.D. degree from Florida State University with 11 years teaching experience, three of which were at Lenoir Rhyne; (g) An Associate Professor of Chemistry with a Ph.D degree from the University of North Carolina, post

doctoral appointments at William and Mary College and the University of Bordeaux (France), with 6 years teaching experience, four at the College; (h) An Associate Professor of Biology with a Ph.D. degree from the University of Arizona, with 6½ years teaching experience, 3½ with the College; (i) An Associate Professor of Religion with a Divinity Degree and a Ph.D. from Yale University, with 8 years teaching experience with the College; (j) An Associate Professor of Latin and Russian, with degrees from State University of Latvia, a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and additional graduate study at the University of Tubingen (Germany), and with 18 years teaching experience, 13 of which were at Lenoir Rhyne.

The Court finds and concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to establish by the evidence and by its greater weight that the Defendant College established or engaged in any practice, pattern, policy or custom of discriminating against faculty members on account of sex in employment, promotion, compensation, or retirement. The Plaintiff's evidence fails to disclose any specific instances of overt discrimination. She relies upon statistical data implying discrimination for her proof and contends that a prima facie case has been established and that she and her class should prevail. There are grave doubts that a showing by statistics indicating a lower average salary for female faculty members as compared to the average salary of male faculty members of a college is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. There are so many legitimate factors which must be considered in determining the salary of a college professor that it would be most difficult, if not impossible, to apply the same rule or standard applicable to an industrial assembly line. The Court is aware of the Supreme Court's holding in *McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in *Barnett v.*

Grant Co., 518 F. 2d 543 (1975), where Judge Craven declared:

> "The district court erred in requiring proof of actual discrimination in addition to the statistical data implying discrimination. Statistics can in appropriate cases establish a prima facie case of discrimination, without the necessity of showing specific instances of overt discrimination." Long v. Sapp, 502 F. 2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. 471 F. 2d 582, 586, and n. 7 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 411 U.S. 939.

The term "appropriate case" used by Judge Craven would indicate the rule would not apply to all types of cases. This Court is inclined to the opinion that a College faculty case is not an "appropriate case" to apply the rule.

But, assuming *arguendo*, that the Plaintiff's evidence establishes a prima facie case and shifts the burden of proof, the Court finds and concludes that the Defendants have met this burden and have shown by strong, clear and convincing evidence that they have not violated the statute and have not discriminated against the Plaintiff and her class on the basis of sex.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-2 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer —

> "(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
>
> "(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive

or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."

The Act further provides:

"(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, * * *."

The Plaintiff's contentions and evidence must be examined in light of the statute. She contends that the College violated the Act by discriminating against female faculty members in: (a) salaries and benefits; (b) equal pay was denied for equal work, and (c) the College followed a practice, pattern, or custom or established a policy of discrimination based on sex in hiring, promoting, granting of tenure, and job assignments, and other terms and conditions of employment.

The only evidence of discrimination in *hiring* is contained in the statistics which show the ratio of female and male faculty members to average for the past eight years about 68 per cent male and 32 per cent female. There is not a scintilla of evidence that the College failed or refused to hire any female, or that its procurement policy is directed toward males and against females, or that it has any hiring practice, custom, or policy which discriminates against women. On the other hand, the College offered evidence to show that it has

no policy or uses any practice, pattern, or custom which discriminates against females. This evidence is contained in the oral testimony of the President of the College, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the Academic Dean of the College, and faculty members. The statistical data offered by the Defendants shows that the College has a greater percentage of female teachers than the national average in Colleges and Universities — the ratio being 68% male to 32% female, while the national average is 75% male to 25% female.

There is no evidence of discrimination in connection with the granting of tenure, or job and committee assignments. The evidence shows that the Plaintiff was granted tenure in accordance with the College policy and practice and that she was assigned to head a committee. In fact, the evidence shows that most female faculty members were given committee assignments and that a reasonable number of them were given responsibilities as Division and Department heads.

The promotion policy adopted by the College in 1969 does not within itself discriminate against female faculty members and the evidence does not show that it has been used in such a manner. The policy requiring a doctorate degree for a faculty member of a college to advance beyond the rank of Assistant Professor is not prohibited by the statute. This is not the type of testing condemned by the Supreme Court in *Griggs v. Duke Power Company*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Ph.D. degree is a credential which presumably is evidence of certain skills and knowledge from which one might predict job performance and is an educational credential which is almost universally required for higher ranks in most colleges. Indeed, accrediting agencies have used this as a standard for evaluation of academic institutions. These agencies are constantly urging colleges to upgrade their requirements for faculty members.

There is no evidence that prior to the adoption of the promotion policy in 1969 that women were discriminated against, nor does this policy violate Title VII by carrying the effects of past discrimination to the present. The evidence reveals that only three (3) individuals hold the rank of Professor on the effective date of Title VII, as to colleges, who did not have a Ph.D. degree. Of these individuals, one was in the School of Business, and one in the Math Department, areas where Ph.D. degrees are relatively scarce and hard to find — either male or female. The other individual had been employed by the College in the Music Department as a full Professor for 37 years before the effective date of the Act, as to colleges. The evidence also shows that a female faculty member in the Music Department was an Associate Professor without a Ph.D. degree and that she had obtained this status prior to the adoption of the policy. She was not required to give up her rank when the policy was adopted. The evidence also shows that there was a significant number of female professors in positions in the Department and Division who participated in the administration of the promotion policy to prevent discrimination based on sex.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant College violated Title VII and the Equal Pay Act by paying her and other female faculty members lower salaries for similar work, because of their sex.

The Plaintiff has the initial burden of proving disparity in salaries with respect to faculty members who held jobs, the performance of which required equal skill, effort and responsibility and which were performed under similar working conditions. Only after Plaintiff's facts established a prima facie claim, would the burden shift to the College to demonstrate that the discriminatory differential, if established, was based on factors other than sex. See *Corning Glass Works v. Brennan*, 417 U.S. 118 (1974).

The College denies any salary disparity based on sex and contends that if a disparity exists, the differential was justified under the merit system exceptions of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.

Applying the law as set forth in *Corning, supra,* the Plaintiff has the initial burden of not only proving that a disparity in salary existed between male and female teachers but that such disparity existed in such positions requiring equal work, equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions. *Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co.* 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973).

The Plaintiff's evidence on this issue consisted entirely of the charts prepared from the salary information furnished by the College for the years 1966-67 through 1973-74. She made no attempt to show that the work performed by males and females was equal, or that the jobs were substantially equal or the same. She made no comparison of salaries discipline by discipline or department by department.

Assuming *arguendo,* that the Plaintiff established a prima facie case, the College went forward with the evidence and showed the wide variety of teaching positions, the wide variety of requirements in skill in the positions and established a wide divergence of qualifications for the various faculty members. It established a salary schedule based on merit. In addition, the College offered evidence to explain each and every instance of disparity in salary between male and female. These discrepancies were based upon legitimate, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory factors. See *McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, supra.*

The standards set by Colleges and Universities as to qualifications for employment and promotion and salaries and benefits of faculty members are matters of professional judg-

ment and a court should be slow to substitute its judgment for the rational and well-considered judgment of those possessing expertise in the field. How can a court evaluate the relative merit as to salary of a doctorate degree in Physics as compared to a doctorate degree in Divinity? As stated by the court in *Green v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech University*, 335 F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Texas 1971, affirmed 474 F. 2d 594, 5th Cir. 1973):

> (1) Texas Tech University has established definite criteria for evaluating a person's eligibility for promotion in teaching rank. The criteria for promotion to full professor are especially exacting, as that is the highest faculty status which can be awarded by a university. The Court finds that these criteria are reasonable, that they bear a rational relationship to the duties of a full professor, and that they were reasonably applied in this case. They call for careful evaluation of (a) teaching ability, (b) publications and scholarly activity, and (c) service to the community and to the University. *It is undisputed that such evaluations are necessarily judgmental, and the Court will not substitute its judgment for the rational and well-considered judgment of those possessing expertise in the field.* (Emphasis added).

See *Faro v. New York University*, 502 F. 2d 1229 (2nd Cir. 1974).

While the actions of the officials of Lenoir Rhyne College in determining salaries and benefits and other conditions of employment of faculty members are far from perfect, the Court finds that based upon all of the circumstances of the operation of this College as shown by the evidence, such actions are reasonable and bear a rational relationship to the

responsibility of obtaining and retaining a competent teaching faculty. The Court further finds that the imperfections and discrepancies existing are not based upon sex.

The Court finds and concludes that the Plaintiff's individual claims of sex discrimination in promotion, job assignment, salary, benefits and termination are without merit. The evidence relied upon for these claims is the same except as to the Plaintiff's termination. As shown in the findings of fact, the evidence does not support her contention that she was terminated because of her sex.

At the close of all the evidence the Court was of the opinion that the evidence was insufficient to show that the individual Defendants, Dr. Raymond M. Bost and Wallace J. Jorgenson, had denied the Plaintiff and her class any rights and, by consent of the parties, the action was dismissed as to each of them. No order was entered, but one will be filed with this Memorandum of Decision.

The Court finds and concludes that the evidence does not support a finding that the College has adopted or pursued, or is pursuing, a policy, practice, pattern, or custom of discrimination on the basis of sex in the payment of salaries and benefits, in the hiring and promotion of its faculty members, or in the granting of tenure and job assignments, or in the retention, termination or retirement, or in other conditions of employment of such faculty members. The jury failed to properly consider and weigh the long, tedious, and sometimes uninteresting evidence offered by the College in explanation of the various instances of disparity in salary schedules, and the Court cannot follow the advisory findings on these issues.

The contract issues were submitted to the jury as a matter of right and that part of the verdict will not be disturbed.

There has been no showing which would entitle the Plaintiff to relief under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Plaintiff and her class are not entitled to relief from the College under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e, et seq., the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 U.S.C.A. 2201 and 2202, or the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.A. 206, et seq., and the action will be dismissed. Based upon the jury verdict and the evidence, the Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under her contract action as set forth in Count Two of her Complaint and that action will likewise be dismissed. An Order dismissing the actions will be entered simultaneously with this Memorandum of Decision.

This the 2nd day of January, 1976.

/s/ WOODROW W. JONES

Chief Judge

APPENDIX B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

DR. ANNIE LAURIE KEYES,
Plaintiff.

vs.

LENOIR RHYNE COLLEGE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

Civil Action
No. ST-C-74-10

JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER was tried before the court and a jury, and based upon the jury verdict and the findings and conclusions of the Court as set forth in a Memorandum of Decision filed simultaneously herewith,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that this action be, and the same is hereby dismissed.

This the 2nd day of January, 1976.

/s/ WOODROW W. JONES
Chief Judge

APPENDIX "C"

ANNIE LAURIE KEYES,

versus

LENOIR RHYNE COLLEGE, a non-profit corporation; WALLACE J. JORGENSON, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Lenoir Rhyne College; RAYMOND M. BOST, President of Lenoir Rhyne College,

No. 76-1134.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Argued Oct. 6, 1976.

Decided March 31, 1977.

Appeal from the United States District court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville, Woodrow Wilson Jones, Chief Judge.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, CRAVEN, Circuit Judge, and FIELD, Senior Circuit Judge.

J. Levonne Chambers, Charlotte, N. C. (Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Becton, Charlotte, N. C., on brief), for appellant.

W. Gene Sigmon, Newton, N. C. (Jesse C. Sigmon, Jr., Sigmon & Sigmon, Newton, N. C., George M. Chapman, Charlotte, N. C., on brief), for appellees.

FIELD, Senior Circuit Judge:

The plaintiff, Dr. Annie Laurie Keyes, filed this action against Lenoir Rhyne College, its President and the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, seeking injunctive, declaratory and pecuniary relief for herself and female faculty members

of the College for alleged discrimination in employment opportunities because of their sex and age.[1] The action was based upon Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, *et seq.*, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.[2] Under the theory of pendent jurisdiction, Dr. Keyes also sought damages for breach of contract under the law of North Carolina. Following a lengthy trial the district judge filed a memorandum decision in which he made findings of fact based upon a detailed and thorough analysis of the evidence presented, and concluded that neither the plaintiff nor her class was entitled to relief. The plaintiff has appealed.

Dr. Keyes had previously been employed by the College from 1945 to 1949 as an associate professor, but had resigned to accept employment with the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. She was reemployed by the College in 1968 at which time she was sixty years of age. In 1969 the Board of Trustees of the College reduced the retirement age of all personnel, including faculty members, from sixty-eight to sixty-five and gave written notice of such change to the faculty and other employees. The Board elected to continue its policy of authorizing extension of service beyond the retirement age on an individual basis when approved by a special vote of the Board. Dr. Keyes reached the age of sixty-five during the 1972-73 school year and on March 31,

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[1]The district court determined that the case should be maintained as a class action on behalf "of past, present and future female faculty who have been, who are presently, and who in the future may be adversely affected by any discriminatory employment practices based upon sex."

[2]Shortly prior to trial the district court granted the plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint to set forth a claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).

1972, was notified that her employment would be terminated at the conclusion of the 1972-73 academic year.

The plaintiff's request that she be permitted to teach beyond her retirement age was denied by the administration and she appealed that decision to the Board of Trustees. Following a full hearing the Board affirmed the decision of the administration and denied Dr. Keyes' request for an extension. After being notified of the Board's decision, the plaintiff filed charges with the Department of Labor as well as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. No action was taken by either of these agencies, and after receipt of her ninety day letter from the EEOC the plaintiff instituted this action.

Lenoir Rhyne College is a private institution with an average student enrollment of 1300 and a relatively small administrative staff and faculty, the total faculty numbering about ninety people. The evidence indicated that between the years 1966 and 1974 the percentage of women on the faculty at Lenoir Rhyne varied from twenty-eight percent to thirty-four percent. This was considerably higher than the national average for colleges and universities which during the 1972-73 academic year was some twenty percent. While the evidence revealed that the average male faculty salary was higher than that of females, there was no showing of any salary differential for teaching positions which were substantially equal, and in presenting her statistical evidence, the plaintiff made no comparison of salaries discipline by discipline or department by department. The district court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facia case by her statistical evidence and concluded that, in any event, the College had presented clear and convincing evidence to explain any disparity in salary between males and females, demonstrating that

such differentials were based upon legitimate, reasonable and non-discriminatory factors.[3] Our review of the record persuades us that these findings of the district court were not clearly erroneous.

During the course of discovery, the plaintiff requested the production of certain records and documents, including copies of the plaintiff's personnel records, the personnel records of current faculty members, together with reports, records and correspondence dealing with the Government's investigation of sex discrimination by the College. The court ordered the disclosure of certain information with respect to all faculty members for the period from September 1, 1966, through the 1973-74 academic year. This information included the name or an identifying number of each faculty member during that period with pertinent data relative to sex, tenure, status, annual salary and department position.[4]

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[3]On the retirement issue the record showed that since 1966 eleven faculty members had been permitted to teach beyond the stated retirement age. During that period three females were granted such an extension and only one, Dr. Keyes, was denied such a privilege. During that same period eight male faculty members were granted such an extension and three were denied. We agree with the district court that these statistics do not suggest that sex discrimination played any part in the grant or denial of such extensions. Dr. Keyes presented no other evidence that the decision of the Board in denying her an extension was based on her sex.

[4]Specifically, the College furnished the following information:

1. The name or identifying number of every faculty member.
2. The sex of each faculty member.
3. The degrees earned and dates of each degree of every faculty member.
4. The date of employment at Lenoir Rhyne College.
5. The present rank of the faculty members.

Pursuant to the court's order the College also produced copies of all correspondence, memoranda and reports which had been forwarded to the Department of Labor, the Department of Justice, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The court, however, declined to order the production of the confidential evaluations of each faculty member which had been made annually by the Division and Department Chairmen commencing with the 1970-71 school year. The plaintiff challenges this action of the court, contending that it precluded her from discovering evidence which would show that the defendants' explanations for certain male-female variances in salaries and promotions were pretextual.

Under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court "may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense * * *," and the scope of such an order lies within the discretion of the trial judge and will be reversed only if there is an abuse of that discretion. *Galella v. Onassis*, 487 F.2d 986 (2 Cir. 1973); *General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Manufacturing Co.*, 481 F.2d 1204 (8 Cir. 1973); 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2036 (1970). In the present case the College asked that the confidentiality of the faculty evaluation rec-

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6. The tenure status of the faculty members.
7. The dates of promotion in rank of faculty members including the date tenure was granted.
8. The annual earning or salary of every faculty member.
9. The annual committee appointments of every faculty member.
10. The annual department position held by every faculty member.
11. All special recognitions and honors of every faculty member with dates.

ords be protected, urging that the assurance of confidentiality enabled the College to receive honest and candid appraisals of the abilities of the faculty members by their peers. It was, of course, necessary for the court to balance this interest of the College against the need of the plaintiff for such material,[5] and if the College had sought to justify any male-female disparity on the basis of these evaluations the plaintiff should have been granted the opportunity to use them to demonstrate that the explanation was pretextual. *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Here, however, the College did not resort to the evaluations for that purpose,[6] and in the absence of some further showing on the part of the plaintiff, the district court's decision to protect these records from disclosure was not an abuse of its discretion.

Discerning no error of fact or law, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

CRAVEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I think the statistical evidence establishes a pattern, practice, or custom of discrimination based on sex against female

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[5]*General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Manufacturing Co.*, 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8 Cir. 1973).

[6]Such evaluations are necessarily judgmental, and had the College seen fit to rely upon them we would be faced with the delicate question of whether the court should "substitute its judgment for the rational and well-considered judgment of those possessing expertise in the field." *Green v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech University*, 335 F.Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. Tex. 1971), *aff'd* 474 F.2d 594 (5 Cir. 1973). *See Faro v. New York University*, 502 F.2d 1229 (2 Cir. 1974).

faculty members with respect to compensation, and that the defendants are shown by such evidence to have denied equal pay to female faculty members for the same or similar work performed by male faculty members. The advisory jury so found, and I think the district judge abused his discretion in disregarding the advice of the jury.

In the 1972-73 school year, Professor Keyes (the plaintiff) was the lowest paid full professor on the faculty, receiving a salary of $12,134, yet her objective point total (which took into consideration degree, rank, experience and merit) ranked her tenth out of 16. The second highest paid professor was a male whose point score was lower than Mrs. Keyes. These comparisons, although disparate on their face, are admittedly not of compelling significance because they include all of the College's professors and are not broken down departmentally.

The record does, however, contain a comparison of salaries within the departments—Plaintiff's Exhibit 13a, "Confidential Salary Information." Within the Education Department of which Mrs. Keyes was a member, it appears that Mrs. Keyes, who was a full professor, received in 1968-69 a salary of $9,450, whereas male professor Schwarzbek received a salary of $10,206 although he was an associate professor and nontenured and she was a full professor and tenured. The documentary evidence for the Education Department also shows that Mr. Wiener was paid $12,015 when Mrs. Keyes received $11,667, although Mr. Wiener was a nontenured assistant professor and Mrs. Keyes was a tenured full professor.

In the Mathematics Department it appears that Mrs. Hawn received a salary of $9,129 and Mr. Smith a salary of $10,438, although they were of the same rank and Mr. Smith was nontenured and Mrs. Hawn was tenured.

In the English Department Mrs. Swink was paid $6,606 and Mr. Mahan was paid $8,865, although both were of the same rank and nontenured. Also in the English Department Mr. Whitesides was paid $7,695 and Mrs. Jeffers, $5,895, although she was tenured and he was not and they were of the same rank.

Despite this statistical showing, my brothers conclude, as did the district judge, that the College "presented clear and convincing evidence to explain any disparity in salary between males and females, demonstrating that such differentials were based upon legitimate, reasonable and nondiscriminatory factors." But they point to no such factors (except with respect to the question of whether there was discrimination in being permitted to teach beyond the stated retirement age). Nor can I find in the district court opinion precisely what factors are different that objectively account for pay disparity within departments.

I agree that even within the same department there may be legitimate salary variances and that college administrators may properly take into account the differences of quality in education and in prior teaching experience and other qualitative factors. But the College made no showing below to account for the disparity of pay in the examples I have set forth hereinabove. The record shows, for example, that when asked to explain the difference between the salaries of a man and a woman within the same department, Dr. Bost, the College's president, responded that he could not say precisely what accounted for the woman's lower salary. (App. at 663). He was the only witness who attempted to explain the disparities shown by Exhibit 13a.

It is clear that a plaintiff in a case such as this may establish a prima facie case by statistical evidence. *Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co.*, 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975). It is also clear to me that the plaintiff here has done so and that the College has failed to satisfactorily explain the disparity in salaries within departments as between males and females.

I would reverse with an instruction to accept the verdict of the advisory jury.

APPENDIX "D"

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 76-1134

ANNIE LAURIE KEYES, *Appellant,*

versus

LENOIR RHYNE COLLEGE, a non-profit corporation; WALLACE J. JORGENSON, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Lenoir Rhyne College; RAYMOND M. BOST, President of Lenoir Rhyne College, *Appellees.*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville.
Woodrow W. Jones, District Judge.

ORDER ON REHEARING

Upon consideration of the appellant's petition for rehearing and of the suggestion for rehearing in banc;

NOW, THEREFORE, with the concurrence of Chief Judge Haynsworth and in the absence of a request for a poll of the entire court as provided by Appellate Rule 35(b),

It is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is denied. Judge Craven had indicated that he desired to be recorded as voting to grant rehearing.

Senior United States Circuit Judge

Filed May 12, 1977

APPENDIX "E"

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IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

NO. 76-1134

DR. ANNIE LAURIE KEYES,

Appellant,

v.

LENOIR RHYNE COLLEGE, a non profit Corporation; WALLACE J. JORGENSON, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Lenoir Rhyne College, and DR. RAYMOND M. BOST, President of Lenoir Rhyne College,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Statesville Division, Woodrow W. Jones, District Judge

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PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC

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IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

NO. 76-1134

DR. ANNIE LAURIE KEYES,

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v.

LENOIR RHYNE COLLEGE, a non profit Corporation; WALLACE J. JORGENSON, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Lenoir Rhyne College, and DR. RAYMOND M. BOST, President of Lenoir Rhyne College,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Statesville Division, Woodrow W. Jones, District Judge

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PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC

This appeal presents a major question of the standards of proof that will be required in equal employment Title VII[1] proceedings and the standard for review of district court fact findings and conclusions of law in such cases. The determina-

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[1]42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e et seq.

tion of these issues will bear substantially on the effective implementation of the congressional objectives in enacting Title VII.

Plaintiff brought this proceeding as a class action. She alleged that she and other female employees of Lenoir Rhyne College had been discriminated against in wages, promotions and other terms and conditions of employment because of their sex. The action was certified as a class action consisting of all past, present and future female faculty members of the College.

At trial, plaintiff presented statistical and other evidence which demonstrated that she and other women as a class had been adversely affected in wages, promotions and other terms of employment because of their sex, both within the same disciplines and departments as well as across the board.[2] The district court noted these discrepancies but felt that more evidence was required to establish discrimination in these cases than in "assembly line" cases. (See pages 164-165 of the Joint Appendix).

The majority of the panel of this Court apparently accepted the district court's position or the alternative ground advanced by the district court that "the College had presented clear and convincing evidence to explain any disparities" in treatment of male and female faculty members.

The panel majority also found no error in the district court's denial to plaintiffs of faculty member evaluations because "the College did not resort to the evaluations" to explain the disparities.

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[2]See pp. 544, 704-720, 928-929, 1262-1269, 1282-1287 of the Joint Appendix and dissenting Opinion of Judge Craven to the panel's decision in this matter on March 31, 1977.

1. The plaintiff respectfully submits that the panel decision is at odds with the standard of proof and review required in Title VII proceedings by the Supreme Court. *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,* 411 U.S. 792 (1973); *Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,* 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and by this Court. *Hairston v. McLean Trucking Company,* 520 F. 2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975); but *cf Roman v. ESB, Inc.,* ___ F. 2d ___, 13 EPD Para. 11,285 (4th Cir. 1976). The plaintiff submits that the Court should give further consideration to the standard of proof sanctioned by the panel decision in this case or should, at least, await further guidance by the Supreme Court's decision in *Rodriquez v. East Texas Motor Freight,* 505 F. 2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974), *cert. granted,* 48 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1976); *United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc.,* 517 F. 2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), *cert. granted,* 48 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1976) and *United States v. Hazelwood School District,* 534 F. 2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976), *cert. granted,* 45 U.S.L.W. 3454 (1977). These three cases raise similar issues as the issue presented in the instant case.

2. The panel majority, the plaintiff submits, also erred in holding that the College did not rely on faculty evaluations in explaining salary and promotion disparities. Defendants' explanation appears on pages 471-547, 649-676 and 868-949 of the Joint Appendix. The plaintiff respectfully calls the Court's attention to these pages, including the following:

Page 678

"Q. Now, am I correct, Dr. Bost, that those (faculty) evaluations are used by the administration in determining merit increases for faculty members?

A. They would influence merit increases, yes."

Page 679

"Q. . . . [b]ut the decisions whether to promote are influenced by the evaluations that come to Dean Unglaube?

A. Yes."

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"Q. I believe that the granting of tenure was also influenced by these evaluations?

A. Yes, it would be influenced."

See also, pages 882-883.

Because of the importance of the issues presented in this appeal, and the adverse affect that the decision of the panel and the district court may have on the effective implementation of Title VII, the plaintiff respectfully prays that the Court grant her a rehearing in this matter and respectfully suggests that the matter be reheard en banc.

This 13th day of April, 1977.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that he has this day served copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC upon counsel for the defendants by depositing copies of same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

Mr. George M. Chapman
1014 Law Building
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

and

Mr. Jesse C. Sigmon, Jr.
Mr. Gene Sigmon
Post Office Box 88
Newton, North Carolina 28658

This 13th day of April, 1977.

J. LeVonne Chambers
Attorney for Appellant - Petitioner

Joint Appendix Page 676

A. Yes, I heard that testimony.

Q. Would you agree with that testimony?

A. I am sure it's correct if he said it, sir.

Q. Now, I want to ask you something about your testimony regarding Dr. Keyes. You testified, as I recall, yesterday that somewhere around 1970 you felt that Dr. Keyes was not performing according to your expectations.

A. That was the report I received, yes sir.

Q. That was a report you received?

A. That is correct.

Q. Who did you receive that report from?

A. From the office of the Academic Dean. Yes, it was the Academic Dean then.

Q. Who was that? Dean Unglaube?

A. That is correct.

Q. Where did he get his information?

A. Presumably from the Department Chairperson.

Q. Do you know where he got his information?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Do you know what the information was based on that he was acting on?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Did you talk to Dr. Keyes about it?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you ask him to talk to Dr. Keyes about it?

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A. No, I did not.

Q. Did he to your knowledge talk to Dr. Keyes about it?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Is there any way you can tell the jury that this evaluation that you acted on that was presented to you by the Dean which he received from apparently the Chairman of the Department was not based on sex?

A. Would you repeat the question?

Q. Is there any way you can tell the jury that the report you received was not based on sex discrimination?

A. No. No way I can tell it.

Q. For all you know, it could have been?

A. Absolutely. It purely could have been based on sex discrimination.

Q. Now, according to Dean Unglaube, the reports that were prepared evaluating faculty members at that time were not the same reports that were identified as Exhibits 20 or 21 of the Keyes deposition. You saw those evaluation forms, didn't you?

A. No, I did not.

Q. You know the evaluation forms that are presently used, don't you?

A. No, I do not.

Q. According to Dean Unglaube, that form was used from about 1970 something to 1973, and since 1973 the two

forms have been used.

A. I see.

Q. Are you telling the jury this is the first time you have seen those forms?

A. No, I didn't say that to the jury, sir, and I don't remember that I have seen them before. I am sure I have seen this one before. I don't recall having seen this.

Q. You have seen the Exhibit 20 before?

A. Yes sir, or one similar to it, I am sure. As I say, I don't recall having seen it.

Q. Now, am I correct, Dr. Bost, that those evaluations are used by the administration in determining merit increases for faculty members?

A. They would influence merit increases, yes.

Q. They would influence your decision?

A. No sir.

Q. They would influence the recommendation —

A. Pardon me. Only indirectly. I don't see the forms.

Q. You just get what Dean Unglaube gives you?

A. That is correct.

Q. Are you telling the jury that those decisions might also be affected by sex discrimination?

A. Surely, if he were inclined to discriminate on the basis of sex.

Q. Or the Chairman of the Department or the Chairman of . . . .

Q. You lost me again. I don't know what forensics is.

A. Debate.

THE COURT: Sometime engaged in by lawyers.

Q. Associate No. 15 was compared with Associate No. 2, and Associate No. 2 has a slightly higher salary.

MR. CHAMBERS: Your Honor, I object to the counsel's characterization of this. This matter is not before the jury, and I don't know whether he calls $3,000 slightly or not, and I think he should refer to the amount.

MR. G. SIGMON: I will withdraw that.

THE COURT: All right. Proceed in order.

Q. Has a higher salary. Would you explain why Associate No. 2 has a higher salary?

A. Associate No. 2 has twenty years of teaching experience, sixteen of which are at Lenoir Rhyne, has held the

rank of Associate Professor for ten years, is Chairman at the present time of the second largest Department on campus, the Business Department. This Professor holds an M.B.A. degree, which is a Master of Business Administration degree, which is rated higher in terms of so-called pecking order of degrees than a Master of Arts degree is. It generally takes two years to complete a Master of Business Administration degree, and I would also indicate that this Professor would be rated as one of the very best on campus.

MR. CHAMBERS: Your Honor, in connection with that

rating, which I understand to be part of an evaluation, we would point out that we have requested these evaluations and have not been allowed to see them to make any kind of comparison. We are at a disadvantage now to cross examine this witness about the ratings of this faculty member because we haven't seen those, and I would object to testimony about them.

THE COURT: Objection overruled. Proceed.

Q. Now, does this Professor, did he receive any honor by the faculty?

A. You are talking about Associate Professor No. 2?

Q. Yes.

A. Associate Professor No. 2 was the recipient of the Distinguished Professor Award, which is awarded not by the faculty but by a joint committee of faculty, students and administration.

Q. Associate No. 15 was compared with Assistant No. 4, I believe — Well, Assistant No. 1 was compared with Assistant No. 1, first.

A. You are saying Associate No. 15 with —

Q. Assistant No. 1.

A. Assistant No. 1 is in the Education Department and has a total of eight years of experience, had served one year at Lenoir Rhyne at the time this analysis was conducted. This faculty member had been serving in administrative posts in

. . . .